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ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP EXPENSES: TAXING TIMES
FOR THE BLM AND MINERS
SERGIO PAREJAt
ABSTRACT
In 2001, the BLM amended 43 C.F.R. Section 3809 to give the BLM the
power to require that mining companies establish a trust fund to provide
for long-term maintenance and water treatment. The amended regula-
tions do not mention taxes, and there is no evidence in the legislative
history that the BLM ever contemplated the income tax effect of utilizing
a trust mechanism to provide for environmental clean-up. While a part-
ner at a law firm, the author of this article had the privilege of being the
primary drafter of the first two trust agreements ever required by the
BLM under these relatively new regulations. This article focuses on the
federal income tax issues related to drafting and funding these trusts.
The author concludes that the law is currently unclear regarding the way
they are taxed, and, as a result, the taxation of these trusts will depend
on the way the trust agreement is drafted. The author offers a proposal
to change the tax law to establish a general rule regarding how these
trusts will be taxed. More specifically, this article proposes that mining
companies should be allowed a present federal income tax deduction for
any funds put into a trust at the request of the BLM Furthermore, such
trusts should be tax-exempt entities if the mining company agrees to
forego any reversionary interest or, if it does not agree to forego its re-
versionary interest, entities that are taxable separate from the mining
company.
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While a partner at HRO's office in Denver, Colorado, the author of this article had the
privilege of being the primary drafter of the first two trust agreements ever required by the Bureau of
Land Management (the "BLM") under 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552. The author developed this article after
he spent well over a year working with the BLM, corporate trustees, and mining companies to draft
trust agreements and to fund trusts that had been required by the BLM under 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552.
Drafting these trust agreements was no small feat given the competing interests.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IN TRODU CTION ..................................................................................... 30 1
1. ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP OBLIGATIONS OF MINERS ............... 304
A. The General Mining Law of 1872 .............................................. 304
B The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970 ............................ 306
C. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 .................. 306
D. Regulation of the Mining of Locatable Minerals by the BLM... 307
E. Regulation of the Mining of Locatable Minerals by the USFS.. 313
II. INCOME TAx ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE OF TRUSTS TO FUND
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP OBLIGATIONS .................................. 315
A. Deduction or Capitalization ....................................................... 315
1. Section 162-Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses.. 316
2. Section 198-Qualified Environmental Remediation
E xpenditures ........................................................................ 3 18
3. Section 162-Revisited ......................................................... 318
4. Section 468-Qualified Reclamation Expenses .................... 319
B . Tim ing Issues ............................................................................. 320
1. Accounting Methods ........................................................... 320
2. Issues Unique to Utilizing Trusts for Remediation Costs ... 321
C. Special Situations ....................................................................... 322
1. Environmental Remediation Trusts ..................................... 322
2. Designated Settlement Funds .............................................. 323
3. Qualified Settlement Funds ................................................. 324
D . G rantor Trusts ........................................................................... 325
1. D eductions ........................................................................... 327
2. Qualifying the Trust as a Grantor Trust with Respect to the
G rantor ................................................................................. 328
3. Qualifying the Trust as a Grantor Trust with Respect to the
B L M .................................................................................... 329
E. Non-Grantor Trusts ................................................................... 330
1. Deductibility of Payments to the Trust ................................ 330
2. Taxation of Income Earned by the Trust ............................. 331
III. PROPOSAL FOR TAX LAW CHANGE ................................................ 331
A . The Op tions ................................................................................ 331
B . P rop osal ..................................................................................... 332
C ON CLU SION ......................................................................................... 333
[Vol. 83:2
2005] TAXING TIMES FOR THE BLMAND MINERS
In a cavern, in a canyon, excavating for a mine,
dwelt a miner forty-niner and his daughter Clementine.l
INTRODUCTION
Times have changed for miners since California's Gold Rush. In
1849, more than 80,000 "forty-niners" flooded into the western lands that
the United States had recently acquired from Mexico to mine for gold,
nearly tripling the population of that territory.2 It was not long after this
"Gold Rush" that Congress enacted the Lode Law of 1866, 3 the Placer
Act of 1870,4 and the General Mining Law of 1872;5 laws that essentially
codified what already was happening in California's gold fields: miners
were freely entering public lands to initiate mining activity.6 These laws
were followed by a long series of federal laws that would eventually
have a great impact on the way miners and mining companies do busi-
ness.7 Although the early laws gave miners great freedom to explore for
precious minerals with almost no environmental constraints, more recent
federal legislation in this area has focused on minimizing the environ-
mental impact of mining activities. 8
In addition to legislation by the United States Congress, rules issued
recently by federal agencies also have had a major impact on mining
activities.9 One of the most significant of these rules is found at 43 Code
1. Excerpt of lyrics from the song "Clementine." National Institute of Health, Department of
Health and Human Services, Clementine, http://www.niehs.nih.gov/kids/lyrics/clementine.htm (last
visited Nov. 9, 2005). Copyright information for the song is unknown. See id. The words and
music are generally attributed to Percy Montross, circa 1880. Id. The song is possibly based on
another song entitled "Down by the River Liv'd a Maiden" by H. S. Thompson (1863). Id.
2. Geoffrey C. Ward & Dayton Duncan, New Perspectives on the West,
http://www.pbs.org/weta/thewest/events/l840_1850.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
3. The Lode Law of 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (1866) (repealed 1872).
4. Placer Act of 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (1870).
5. General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (2005)).
6. The Lode Law of 1866, 14 Stat. 251; Placer Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 217; General Mining
Law of 1872, 17 Stat. 91. These laws were intended to give miners broad rights over valuable min-
erals that they had discovered. See Roger Flynn, The 1872 Mining Law as an Impediment to Min-
eral Development on the Public Lands: A 19th Century Law Meets the Realities of Modern Mining,
34 LAND & WATER L. REV. 301, 302 (1999).
7. See, e.g., Building Stone Act of 1892, ch. 375, 27 Stat. 348 (1892); Saline Placer Act of
1901, ch. 186, 31 Stat. 745 (1901); Surface Resources Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. §§ 611-15 (1955);
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1976).
8. See, e.g., Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82
(1976). See also F. K. Allgaier, Environmental Effects of Mining, in MINING ENVIRONMENTAL
HANDBOOK: EFFECTS OF MINING ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROLS ON MINING 132 (Jerrold J. Marcus ed., 1997) (noting that early hardrock miners "usually
did not worry about land reclamation or the quality of surface and ground waters as a result of min-
ing").
9. See, e.g., 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (2005) and 36 C.F.R. § 228a (2005). Regulations affecting
hardrock mining are predominantly issued by the Department of the Interior and the Department of
Agriculture. Virtually all of the public lands in the United States open to hardrock mining are ad-
ministered by the following two federal agencies that manage land: (1) the Bureau of Land Man-
agement (part of the Department of the Interior) and (2) the United States Forest Service (part of the
Department of Agriculture). John F. Seymour, Hardrock Mining and the Environment: Issues of
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of Federal Regulations ("C.F.R.") Section 3809.10 These regulations
were originally promulgated by the United States Department of the Inte-
rior's Bureau of Land Management (the "BLM") in 1980 and later
amended in their entirety in 2001.1" Significantly, the amended version
of these regulations gave the BLM, for the first time, the power to re-
quire that mining companies establish a trust fund to provide for long-
term maintenance and water treatment (an "environmental clean-up
trust"). 12  Specifically, 43 C.F.R. Section 3809.552(c) provides as fol-
lows:
When [the] BLM identifies a need for it, [the mining company] must
establish a trust fund or other funding mechanism available to [the]
BLM to ensure the continuation of long-term treatment to achieve
water quality standards and for other long-term, post-mining mainte-
nance requirements. The funding must be adequate to provide for
construction, long-term operation, maintenance, or replacement of
any treatment facilities and infrastructure, for as long as the treatment
and facilities are needed after mine closure. [The] BLM may identify
the need for a trust fund or other funding mechanism during plan re-
view or later.'
3
43 C.F.R. Section 3809 does not mention taxes, and there is no evi-
dence in the legislative history of those regulations that the BLM ever
contemplated the income tax effect of utilizing a trust mechanism to pro-
vide for environmental clean-up after mining activities. In fact, the only
guidance that appears in those regulations regarding the structure of the
trust agreement and administration of the trust fund is the following pro-
vision: "[The] BLM will periodically review the estimated cost of rec-
lamation and the adequacy of any [trust fund] and require increased coV-
Federal Enforcement and Liability, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 795, 813 (2004). Specifically, the Bureau of
Land Management manages about 260 million acres of land in the western United States (about one-
eighth of all land in the United States), of which approximately 90% is open to hardrock mining, and
the United States Forest Service manages about 160 million acres of land in the western United
States, of which approximately 80% is open to hardrock mining. Id. at 811, 813; Thomas F. Darin,
The Bureau of Land Management's Proposed Surface Management Regulations for Locatable
Mineral Operations: Preventing or Allowing Degradation of the Public Lands?, 35 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 309, 309 (2000).
10. 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (2005). These regulations are referred to as the "3809 Regulations" and
the "Bureau of Land Management's Surface Management Regulations for Locatable Mineral Opera-
tions."
11. 65 C.F.R. § 6998 (2005). See also Darin, supra note 9, at 310.
12. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552(c) (2005).
13. Id. Note that the BLM can require the use of a trust fund at any time, even after plan
review or after mining work has commenced. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3809.552(b), (c) (2005). In the author's
experience, however, the BLM intends to use this provision to require the creation of trust funds
before it will issue a permit to start digging. To the author's knowledge, the BLM has not mandated
the use of a trust by a mining company after issuing a permit to that mining company.
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erage, if necessary." 14 The tax effects of this provision are ambiguous
and vary widely, depending on how the provision is interpreted.' 5
Although a myriad of non-tax drafting issues arose while the author
worked on the first two environmental clean-up trusts ever required by
the BLM, this article focuses on the federal income tax issues related to
drafting and funding environmental clean-up trusts.1 6 Part I of this arti-
cle addresses miners' historical clean-up obligations and discusses the
history of federal legislation and agency rules regarding hardrock mining
(with an emphasis on environmental issues).' 7 Part II discusses federal
income tax issues related to environmental clean-up, in general and,
more specifically, focuses on federal income tax issues related to the use
of environmental clean-up trusts.' 8 This section concludes that the law is
currently unclear regarding the way that environmental clean-up trusts
are taxed, and the taxation of these trusts will depend heavily on the way
the trust is drafted.' 9 Part III proposes to change the tax law by establish-
ing a clear rule regarding how these trusts will be taxed.20 More specifi-
cally, this section proposes that mining companies should be allowed a
present federal income tax deduction for any funds put into an environ-
mental clean-up trust at the request of the BLM.21 Furthermore, Part III
proposes that such trusts should be tax-exempt entities if the mining
company agrees to forego any reversionary interest.22  Or, if the mining
company does not agree to forego its reversionary interest, the environ-
mental clean-up trusts should be taxed separate from the mining com-
pany. 3
The proposed change to the law discussed in this article would pro-
vide tax certainty and simplicity for mining companies and the BLM
when they are negotiating the terms of environmental clean-up trusts;
14. § 3809.552(b). "Reclamation" generally means the "process of improving disturbed land
(soil, vegetation, water) to achieve land capability equivalent to the predisturbed condition." Uni-
versity of Alberta, Land Reclamation, Remediation and Restoration,
http://www.rr.ualberta.ca/Research/Index.aspPage=LRRR (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). "Remedia-
tion" generally means the "process of removing, reducing or neutralizing industrial soil and sediment
contaminants that threaten human health and/or ecosystem productivity and integrity." Id For
convenience and because the differences in meaning do not have an impact on the tax issues dis-
cussed in this article, the author has used the words "clean-up," "remediation," and "reclamation"
interchangeably throughout this article.
15. See infra notes 251-53 and accompanying text,
16. Other issues included such things as the effect of the Rule Against Perpetuities, the situs
of the trusts, the protection of trust assets from creditors in the event of bankruptcy of the mining
company, the use of an investment director in addition to a trustee, and the identities of the trust
grantor and beneficiary. In addition, state and local tax issues arose during negotiations. These
issues are not addressed in this article.
17. See infra Part 1.
18. See infra Part II.
19. See id.
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this certainty and simplicity, in turn, would greatly expedite the process
of negotiating and funding these trusts.24 Society as a whole would bene-
fit from this because these trusts are one of the most effective ways to
ensure that the environment will be cleaned up after mining activities.25
By providing certainty regarding the taxation of these trusts and by giv-
ing mining companies a tax incentive to forego any reversionary interest,
tax policy will expedite and encourage the adequate funding of trusts to
ensure that the environment will be kept clean for future generations of
Americans.26
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP OBLIGATIONS OF MINERS
Before analyzing the taxation of environmental clean-up trusts, it is
essential to understand the fascinating history of federal laws that regu-
late mining activity. These laws, which include both legislation by the
United States Congress and rules by federal agencies, demonstrate that
the government is increasingly responding to public pressure to ensure
that the environment will be cleaned up after mining activities. 27 Fur-
thermore, history demonstrates that trust funds are the latest in a long
line of efforts to ensure that mining companies provide adequate funds to
clean up the environment, and that those funds will be protected from the
creditors of the mining companies.28
A. The General Mining Law 0f187229
The General Mining Law of 1872 (the "1872 Law"), which was
signed into law by President Ulysses S. Grant on May 10, 1872, origi-
nally promoted westward expansion by allowing all U.S. citizens, as well
as those planning to become U.S. citizens, to keep for themselves any
valuable minerals that they might discover on federal land.3°
The 1872 Law made no provision for reclamation of mined lands,




27. See infra Part I.A-E. This section is not intended to list all mining laws. The purpose of
this section is to give an overview of a few of the major laws that have had an impact on hardrock
mining.
28. See id.
29. General Mining Law of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 (1872) (codified as amended at 30
U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (2005)).
30. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 29 (2005). Specifically, the 1872 Law provides as follows:
All valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States, both surveyed and
unsurveyed, shall be free and open to exploration and purchase, and the lands in which
they are found to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and those who
have declared their intention to become such ... it shall be assumed that the applicant is
entitled to a patent, upon the payment to the proper officer of $5 per acre ....
17 Stat. at 91.
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ernment oversight of mining operations. 3' Although the original law
applied to all "valuable mineral deposits" on government lands except
coal,32 subsequent changes to the law limited its application, especially
with respect to minerals that could be used for fuel, such as oil and natu-
ral gas.33
Currently, the 1872 Law authorizes and governs prospecting and
mining for hardrock or "locatable" minerals on public lands. 34 With re-
spect to locatable minerals, the 1872 Law has remained remarkably un-
changed since its enactment. 35 Generally, the two essential elements of a
valid mining claim under the 1872 Law are "discovery" and "location.
3 6
37 38*A patent, costing only $5.00 per acre, gives the prospector title to the
locatable minerals and the surface estate where the minerals are located
for placer and lode claims.39  The federal government does not collect
any royalties for the extracted minerals.
40
31. See Darin, supra note 9, at 310-12 (discussing the history of the BLM and the origin of 43
C.F.R. § 3809 (2005)).
32. Seeid. at 311.
33. See id. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-96 (2005), removes oil, gas,
oil shale, phosphates, sodium, and other minerals from the claim/patent system of the 1872 Law. Id.
The Materials Act of 1947, 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-04 (2000), provides for the sale or public giveaway of
certain minerals, such as sand or gravel. Id. The Multiple Mineral Development Act, 30 U.S.C. §§
521-31 (2005), provides for the development of multiple minerals on the same tracts of public land.
Id. The Multiple Surface Use Mining Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. §§ 601, 603, 611-15 (2005), removes
certain common varieties of minerals from the list of minerals to which the 1872 Law applies. Id.
The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1701 (2005), redefines claim
recording procedures and provides for abandonment if the procedures are not followed. Id.
34. See Darin, supra note 9, at 309-10. "Locatable mineral" is "[a] legal term that, for federal
lands in the United States, defines a mineral or mineral commodity that is acquired through the
[1872 Law]." NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HARDROCK MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS 14 (1999)
(hereinafter NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL), available at http://books.nap.edu/html/hardrock fed
lands/index.html (follow "Introduction" hyperlink). These are the base and precious metal ores,
ferrous metal ores, and certain classes of industrial minerals. Id. Examples of locatable minerals
include but are not limited to, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, magnesium, nickel, tungsten,... [and]
uranium." Id. This term is often used interchangeably with "hardrock mineral." Id. at 12-13.
35. See generally Darin, supra note 9, at 311-12 (discussing history of the 1872 Law). This
long period of minimal change with respect to "locatable minerals" occurred notwithstanding the
fact that there have been many changes to land laws since the late nineteenth century. See generally
id.
36. See id. Specifically, after a prospector makes a "discovery" of a valuable mineral on
public land, a mining claim must then be "located." Id. A valid mining claim gives the locator the
exclusive right of possession to the mineral deposit. Id.
37. A patent is not needed to extract the minerals from a mining claim. Id.
38. Id. A patent may also cost $2.50 per acre, in certain circumstances. Id. However, this
difference is not relevant to the tax issues addressed in this article.
39. Id. "Placer claims" generally involve mineral-bearing gravels and sands. Id. "Lode
claims" are located on bedrock. Id.
40. Id.
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B. The Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 197041
President Richard M. Nixon signed the Mining and Minerals Policy
Act of 197042 (the "1970 Act") into law on December 31, 1970.43 The
1970 Act expressly declared that it is the policy of the United States to
reduce the adverse impact of mining activities on the environment.
44
Although the stated goals of the 1970 Act were lofty, after its passage,
the federal government continued to refrain from overseeing and moni-
toring mining activities with respect to locatable minerals on public
lands; indeed, the federal government was not privy to information re-
garding most locatable mineral mining claims until the enactment of the
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1 976. 41
C. Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 197646
On October 21, 1976, President Gerald R. Ford signed the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 197641 (the "FLPMA") into law.
This Act represented a drastic change to the law at that time.4 8 The
FLPMA gave the BLM its comprehensive mission to manage public
lands for a variety of uses in order to benefit present and future genera-
tions.49 The FLPMA also established numerous policies related to con-
servation, attempted to appease vastly different and competing con-
cerns,50 and declared that the Department of the Interior would manage
41. Mining and Minerals Policy Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-631, 84 Stat. 1876 (1970) (codi-
fied as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 21a (2005)).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. Specifically, the 1970 Act declared that it is the policy of the United States to encour-
age:
[T]he study and development of methods for the disposal, control, and reclamation of
mineral waste products, and the reclamation of mined land, so as to lessen any adverse
impact of mineral extraction and processing upon the physical environment that may re-
sult from mining or mineral activities.
Id.
45. See Darin, supra note 9, at 312.
46. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (2005).
47. Id.
48. See generally Eleanor R. Schwartz, A Capsule Examination of the Legislative History of
the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 285, 285-86 (1979). Prior
to the enactment of the FLPMA in 1976, there were several congressional efforts to pass comprehen-
sive environmental legislation with respect to mining operations, but none of the bills that passed
were signed into law. See generally id. at 286-96. Each of these bills possessed increasing com-
plexity. See generally id
49. Darin, supra note 9, at 312. The BLM originally had been established by a 1946 Execu-
tive Order, but the FLPMA gave it enforcement authority, a larger budget, and more coherence as an
agency. Id.
50. See 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8) (2005). Specifically relevant to mining activities, the FLPMA
declared that:
[I]t is the policy of the United States that ... the public lands be managed in a manner
that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air
and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values; that, where appropriate, will
preserve and protect certain public lands in their natural condition; that will provide food
and habitat for fish and wildlife and domestic animals; and that will provide for outdoor
recreation and human occupancy and use.
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the land for various uses into the future51 in a way that would prevent
unnecessary degradation of the land.52
Although the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
stated that requiring a bond or other security was one of the most impor-
tant provisions of the Senate version of the bill that ultimately became
the FLPMA,53 the House bill did not include this provision. 4 Indeed,
Congressional staff could not reconcile the House and Senate positions
on this issue in its report to the conference committee, 5 and no provision
requiring reclamation was included in the final legislation. 6
D. Regulation of the Mining of Locatable Minerals by the BLM
In 1980, the BLM promulgated its first regulations affecting mining
activities that disturb the land's surface (the "Original 3809 Regula-
tions").57 These regulations divided mining activities into the following
three levels: (1) casual use, (2) notice-level, and (3) plan of operations-
level.58  "Casual use" means use that generally does not disturb the
land. 59 "Notice-level" includes use that causes a cumulative surface dis-
turbance of no more than five acres during any calendar year.60 Finally,
"plan of operations-level ' 6' includes use that is greater than casual use
and notice-level.62
The Original 3809 Regulations required reclamation of all mining
operations, but bonding requirements for the various types of mining
Id.
51. See § 1732(a). Specifically, the FLPMA states that the Secretary of the Interior "shall
manage the public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield." Id.
52. § 1732(b). The FLPMA states that "In managing the public lands the Secretary shall, by
regulation or otherwise, take any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of
the lands." Id,
53. S. COMM. ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES, LEGIS. HISTORY OF THE FED. LAND
POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976 (PUB. LAW 94-579) 68-69, 74, 91, 107 (Comm. Print
1978). This requirement in the Senate bill corresponded to a recommendation by the Public Land
Law Review Commission that users of the land be held responsible for restoration when the use has
an adverse impact on the environment. Id.
54. Id. at 745.
55. Id. at 748, 796.
56. Id. at 930.
57. 43 C.F.R. § 3809 (2005). See Darin, supra note 9, at 313.
58. Id. § 3809.1-1, .1-9(a), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR BUREAU OF LAND
MGMT., SURFACE MANAGEMENT REGULATIONS FOR LOCATABLE MINERAL OPERATIONS (43 C.F.R.
3809) FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT app. A (Oct. 2000) [hereinafter FINAL EIS],
available at http://www.blm.gov/nhp/Commercial/SolidMineral/3809-EIS/1-cover.htm. Appendix
A contains the version of 43 C.F.R. § 3809 that was in effect from 1980 until 2001. See id.
59. See id. § 3809.0-5(b), reprinted in FINAL EIS, supra note 58. Specifically, "casual use" is
defined to mean "activities ordinarily resulting in only negligible disturbance of the Federal lands
and resources." Id. The "casual use" level specifically does not include the use of earth-moving
equipment, explosives, and the use of motorized vehicles in certain designated areas. Id.
60. Id. § 3809.1-3(a).
61. Also referred to herein as "operations-level" use.
62. See § 3809.1-4, reprinted in FINAL EIS, supra note 58. Specifically, operations-level use
is use that (1) exceeds notice-level use, (2) is conducted in designated conservation, scenic, or wil-
derness areas, or (3) requires the use of motorized vehicles in certain designated areas. See id.
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operations differed.63 For example, no bonding was required to secure
the mining company's obligation to reclaim casual use or notice-level
mining activities. 6' Operations-level mining was left to the discretion of
an "authorized officer" whether to require a bond.65 In practice, bonding
was required only when the operator had a record of noncompliance.
66
In the 1990s, precious metal prices dropped significantly, and as a
result, many locatable mineral mine operators on federal lands in the
western Unites States abandoned their mines. 67 This experience demon-
strated that reclamation requirements and bonds were often inadequate,68
especially after a mine operator's bankruptcy, a bond issuer's default,
69
or when the bond expired long before the mining activity ceased.y In
addition, the combined effect of advances in mining techniques, poor
oversight on the part of the BLM, and mounting evidence of environ-
mental "disasters" related to mining began to prompt calls for mining
law and regulatory reform.7'
In several reports issued in the mid-1980s, the General Accounting
Office (the "GAO"), Congress' investigative arm, detailed many mining-
related concerns, including the following: (1) the BLM's failure to re-
quire the posting of a reclamation bond by most miners, 72 (2) the BLM's
failure to screen mining claims to ensure that those claims were not on
land withdrawn from mineral development,73 (3) the BLM's failure to
inspect most mining operations in the western United States,74 and
(4) the BLM's failure to take action with respect to numerous unre-
claimed mining sites.75 The GAO concluded that mandatory bonding
was necessary to help ensure proper reclamation.7 6 In an additional re-
63. See id. § 3809.1-9.
64. Id. § 3809.1-9(a).
65. Id. § 3809.1-9(b). An "authorized officer" is "any employee of the Bureau of Land
Management to whom authority has been delegated to perform the duties described." Id. § 3809.0-
5(a).
66. See FINAL EIS, supra note 58, at "Summary."
67. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. - FOREST SERV., TRAINING GUIDE FOR RECLAMATION BOND
ESTIMATION AND ADMINISTRATION: FOR MINERAL PLANS OF OPERATION AUTHORIZED AND
ADMINISTERED UNDER 36 C.F.R. § 228A 4 (2004) (hereinafter "TRAINING GUIDE"), available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/geology/bondguide-042004.pdf
68. Id.
69. For example, the operator of the Summitville Mine in south-central Colorado declared
bankruptcy in 1992, and the mine was added to the Superfund National Priorities List in 1994. U.S.
E.P.A., Region 8-Superfund, Summitville Mine, http://www.epa.gov/region8/superfund/co/
summitville/index.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005). To date, the cleanup has cost an estimated $210
million, and reclamation still is not complete. Id.
70. Ronald W. Cattany, Remarks at the Colo. Dep't of Natural Res. Annual Membership
Meeting, http://www.coloradomining.org/cattanyl21202.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2005).
71. See Darin, supra note 9, at 315-18 (detailing General Accounting Office reports of min-
ing's environmental impact and the lack of effective BLM oversight).
72. Id. at 316.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 317.
76. Id. at 335. This was already the practice with mining activities on lands administered by
the United States Forest Service. Id. at 337 n.42.
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port, the GAO also described the large amount of damage to public lands
that had resulted from mining activities.
77
In light of the BLM's experiences in administering the Original
3809 Regulations, as described above, and in light of the increasing dif-
ficulty in obtaining surety bonds, in 1991, the BLM published its intent
to revise the bonding requirements.78 The proposed changes would have
expanded the range of financial instruments acceptable as financial guar-
antees. 79 This would have allowed mine operators considerable flexibil-
ity in structuring financial guarantees.8 °
By 1992, it became apparent that Congress intended to reform the
1872 Law. 81 As a result, the BLM stopped its efforts to revise the Origi-
nal 3809 Regulations. 82 Unfortunately, although the House and the Sen-
ate each passed their own bill in 1993 that would have revised the 1872
Law, the House and Senate could not reach an agreement on either bill,
and neither was enacted.83
In 1997, several years after the House and Senate failed to reach an
agreement regarding changes to the 1872 Law, the BLM published an
amendment to the Original 3809 Regulations (the "1997 Amendment").
84
The 1997 Amendment required financial guarantees from all mining
activity exceeding "casual use" and expanded the scope of acceptable
financial instruments that would provide these guarantees.85 Despite the
general increase in forms of financial security that the BLM could seek,
the 1997 Amendment did not allow the BLM to require mortgages on
mining properties or liens on mining equipment.86 In addition, the 1997
77. Id. at 317-18. According to this report, this damage covered hundreds of thousands of
acres. Id.
78. See Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 56 Fed. Reg.
31,602, 31,602 (July 11, 1991) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809). This appears to have been, in
part, in response to a GAO report regarding the declining availability of surety bonds due to tight-
ened requirements in the surety industry in the 1980s. See id.; Darin, supra note 9, at 318.
79. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 56 Fed. Reg. at
31,602 (discussed in the BLM's Statement of Intent).
80. See id. at 31,603. Mine operators would be given flexibility to "structure financial guar-
antees in a fashion that would not [threaten] a firm's liquidity and [that would not] harm its ability to
continue exploration and development activities on Federal Lands or to reclaim disturbed land." Id.
81. Darin, supra note 9, at 318.
82. Id.
83. Id. The Senate bill would not have imposed any new standards for reclamation, but it
would have required a surety or bond in an amount sufficient to complete the reclamation of mined
lands. Id. at 318-19. The House bill would have established a payment of royalties to the Govern-
ment for reclamation projects and would have imposed strict standards for reclamation. See id. at
319-21.
84. Id.
85. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 62 Fed. Reg. 9093
(Feb. 28, 1997) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
86. Id. at 9095. There also was some concern expressed about the liquidity of various secu-
rity instruments and market fluctuations, but the BLM determined that the risk of inadequate security
due to these concerns was acceptable, in light of the financial guarantees being equal to reclamation
costs, the provision for periodic review of security instruments to ensure they equal reclamation
costs, and the potential for criminal penalties and civil enforcement. Id. at 9097.
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Amendment merely relied upon a "certification" from the operator of the
mine that a financial guarantee was in place prior to mining.
87
Shortly after the 1997 Amendment was adopted, the Northwest
Mining Association, a mining trade association, successfully challenged
it in the D.C. District Court. 88 The court remanded the 1997 Amend-
ment to the BLM for changes because it failed to comply with the terms
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
89 in its rulemaking process.
90
In light of the remand and changes in mining technology and proc-
esses,91 the BLM proposed to completely revise the Original 3809 Regu-
lations, rather than just to amend them.92 A "significant aspect" of this
decision was "to respond to the remand [from the D.C. District Court] by
re-promulgating strengthened financial guarantee provisions. 93  The
proposed new rule would address financial guarantees differently from
the way they were addressed in the 1997 Amendment in several ways.94
The proposed new rule would require financial guarantees to be "actual"
guarantees rather than just certifications, would require the guarantees be
posted in the actual amount of the estimated reclamation costs, and
would expand the permissible types of financial instruments. 95 Impor-
tantly, the proposed new rule would also allow the BLM to require "a
long-term funding mechanism for water treatment and other post-mining
maintenance requirements."
96
Much of the BLM's motivation for adopting this proposed change
to the Original 3809 Regulations resulted from its experiences with in-
solvent and bankrupt mine operators.97 As a result, the BLM took the
position that post-mining maintenance should be covered by these guar-
antees.98
87. Id. at 9096. The 1997 Amendment also imposed a requirement that the financial guaran-
tees cover one hundred percent of the reclamation costs and imposed a floor of $1,000 per acre and
$2,000 per acre for notice-level and operations-level activities, respectively. Id.
88. Nw. Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt, 5 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14-16 (D.D.C. 1998).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2005).
90. Nw. Mining Ass'n, 5 F. Supp. 2d at 14-16.
91. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed. Reg.
6422, 6424 (Feb. 9, 1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
92. Id. at 6423-24. The BLM's proposal to revise the Original 3809 Regulations was also
prompted by the various GAO reports on mining. Id. at 6423.
93. Id. at 6424.
94. Id. at 6441.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 6442. With this provision, the BLM sought to overcome the financial constraints of
mine operators without burdening the taxpayers, it expressed its view that reclamation obligations
continue past bankruptcy, and it expressed its view that this provision may help prevent damage to
the environment by allowing maintenance of a mining site when the operator has stopped operations.
Id.
98. See generally id. See also FINAL EIS, supra note 58, at VOL. 2, COMMENTS AND
RESPONSES § 14.
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The proposed new rule would, in certain circumstances, allow the
BLM to require the mine operator to fund a trust to provide funds to pro-
vide for future maintenance. 99 This provision was aimed at ensuring that
enough funds would be available for clean-up if it appeared that a fully-
reclaimed mine would continue to discharge pollutants well into the fore-
seeable future.100
In 1998, while the BLM was working on its new proposed rule,
Congress commissioned the National Academy of Sciences to study the
hardrock mining regulations of both the Department of the Interior and
the Department of Agriculture. 01 This study (the "1999 Study"), re-
leased by the National Research Council (the "NRC") in September of
1999, recommended numerous changes that would effectively bring the
Original 3809 Regulations into closer alignment with the analogous
United States Forest Service ("USFS") regulations.0 2 The 1999 Study
identified numerous problems with then-current practices. 0 3  The issue
of financial guarantees appeared in the context of necessary improve-
ments in the regulations," °4 differential treatment of smaller mining op-
erations (notice-level),10 5 and planning for future uses of the land and
monitoring.
06
The NRC's first formal recommendation relating to financial guar-
antees was that they should be required for any disturbance to the land
greater than "casual use."' 1 7  Justification for this recommendation in-
cluded the cumulative impact of a large number of smaller mining opera-
tions.'0 8
99. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed. Reg.
6422, 6442 (Feb. 9, 1999) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809). Specifically, the trust would be used
to ensure "the continuation of long-term water treatment to achieve water quality standards or [to
provide funds] for other long-term, post-mining maintenance requirements." Id.
100. Id. Specifically, the provision was "designed to deal with the situation where an other-
wise fully reclaimed mining operation will continue for the foreseeable future to discharge pollut-
ants, such as acid mine drainage, into surface waters" and required the operator to set aside sufficient
funds which, when invested, would generate "income sufficient to pay for the ongoing cost of what-
ever treatment is required to meet applicable water quality standards for as long as the treatment is
necessary." Id. See also 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552(c) (2005).
101. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-277, § 120, 112 Stat. 2681, 257-58 (1998).
102. Press Release, The National Academies, Action Needed to Improve Effectiveness of Laws
that Govern Mineral Mining on Federal Lands (Sept. 29, 1999) (on file with author), available at
http://www4.nationalacadeniies.org/news.nsf/isbn/0309065968?OpenDocument. See also NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34.
103. Press Release, supra note 102. Identified problems included, for example, the lack of any
time constraints on how long a mine could be shut down "temporarily" and go without reclamation
and the failure to require bonding of smaller mining operations on BLM lands. Id.
104. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 65.
105. Id. at 71.
106. Id. at 83-86.
107. Id. at 93. Specifically, the NRC recommended that "[f]inancial assurance should be
required for reclamation of disturbances to the environment caused by all mining activities beyond
those classified as casual use, even if the area disturbed is less than 5 acres." Id.
108. Id. at 93-94.
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The NRC's second formal recommendation relating to financial
guarantees was that the government needed to plan for long-term man-
agement of mining sites after the mining was complete.'0 9 This was jus-
tified by a need for post-closure maintenance and management of mining
operations after the release of reclamation bonds."10 Thus, the NRC
deemed long-term financial assurances to be necessary to truly accom-
plish the missions of both the BLM and the [USFS] and to prevent the
financial burden of long-term and monitoring costs from falling on the
taxpayers.' 1
After the 1999 Study, the BLM published its new proposed rule on
November 21, 2000.112 The BLM expressed its agreement in principle
with the NRC's recommendations with respect to financial guarantees."
13
The fact that the BLM's new proposed rule was in line with the 1999
Study is not a coincidence; Congress had mandated that any changes to
the Original 3809 Regulations were to be "not inconsistent" with the
1999 Study.
114
The comment period occurred in late 2000 and early 2001.115 The
comments regarding the use of trusts for mining reclamation purposes
varied widely; environmental groups were often "supportive," while the
mining industry "strongly opposed" the proposed new rule." 6 With re-
spect to trust funds, the BLM stated that it would identify the "need" for
109. Id. at 118. Specifically, the NRC determined that the "BLM and the [USFS] should plan
for and assure the long-term post-closure management of mine sites on federal lands." Id.
110. Id. at 118-19.
Ill. Id. at 118-20.
112. See MARC HUMPHRIES, MINING ON FEDERAL LANDS 14 (2005),
http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/05Feb/IB89130.pdf; Mining Claims Under the General
Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,998, 69,998 (Nov. 21, 2000) (to be codified at
43 C.F.R. § 3809).
113. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
69,998-99. The BLM also used the NRC's second recommendation regarding financial guarantees
to bolster its case for adopting the trust fund mechanism and to reiterate its position that a "bond
release" does not release mine operators from their reclamation obligations. Mining Claims Under
the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 64 Fed. Reg. 57,613, 57,617 (Oct. 26, 1999) (to be
codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
114. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
69,998. See also Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 106-291, § 156, 114 Stat. 922, 962 (2000).
115. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
69,998. The new rule had an initial effective date of January 20, 2001. Id. The Bush Administra-
tion proposed suspending this in its entirety on March 23, 2001 to allow the BLM to address legal
and policy concerns that the Administration raised. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws;
Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,162, 16,162 (Mar. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. §
3809). After additional comments through May 7, 2001, as well as additional amendments, the final
rule was published on October 30, 2001; it had an effective date of December 31, 2001. Mining
Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. 54,834, 54,834 (Oct.
30, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
116. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 65 Fed. Reg. at
70,065-66.
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one on a case-by-case basis, 1 7 but that sometimes a trust would be nec-
essary.' 18
On October 30, 2001, after the comment period, the BLM adopted
the new rule." 9 Although the new rule had been suspended 20 and sub-
stantially revised 121 in the early days of the Bush Administration, the
provisions regarding financial guarantees were not. 22  In its current
form, the new rule (the "New 3809 Regulations") requires a financial
guarantee for any mining activity in excess of "casual use."'
123
E. Regulation of the Mining of Locatable Minerals by the USFS
Although this Article is intended to analyze trusts created under the
New 3809 Regulations, it is interesting to compare reclamation require-
ments on property under the control of USFS. As mentioned above, the
USFS and the BLM are the two federal agencies that administer nearly
all public land open to hardrock mining. 124 The USFS derives its author-
ity from the Organic Administration Act of 1897125 (the "Organic
Act"). 126 The Organic Act states that that the Department of Agriculture
will issue regulations to protect certain public lands from degradation,
27
but that those regulations will not prohibit mining on the certain public
lands.
128
117. Id. at 70,070.
118. Id. at 70,069. Specifically, the BLM stated that "In some circumstances, an important or
perhaps the only way an operator may protect water quality from unnecessary or undue degradation
is to provide for long-term water treatment. The trust fund or other funding mechanism is appropri-
ate to assure that long-term treatment and other maintenance will continue." Id. at 70,069.
119. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg.
54,834, 54,834 (Oct. 30, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
120. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg.
16,162, 16,162 (Mar. 23, 2001) (to be codified at 43 C.F.R. § 3809).
121. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management, 66 Fed. Reg. at
54,834.
122. Id. at 54,842.
123. Id. The New 3809 Regulations eliminated several of the more substantive provisions of
the rules promulgated in 2000 so as not to "disrupt" or "confuse" the mining industry and the various
state regulatory bodies. Id. at 54,835. See Roger Flynn & Jeffrey C. Parsons, The Right to Say No:
Federal Authority over Hardrock Mining on Public Lands, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 249, 326-29
(2001) (detailing many of the revisions to 43 C.F.R. § 3809 and the changes made thereto by the
BLM under the Bush Administration).
124. See supra text accompanying note 9.
125. Flynn & Parsons, supra note 123, at 260.
126. Id.
127. Id. Specifically, the Organic Act states:
The Secretary of Agriculture shall make provisions for the protection against destruction
by fire and depredations upon the public forests and national forests.., and he may make
such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the objects of such
reservations, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests
thereon from destruction.
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 551 (1994)).
128. Id. The Organic Act further states that "[n]othing in [the language in Note 127] shall be
construed as prohibiting.., any person from entering upon such national forests for all proper and
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The USFS promulgated its rules regarding hardrock mining in 1974
(the "USFS Regulations"). 129 Like the New 3809 Regulations, the USFS
Regulations are in accordance with the policies of the 1872 Law.
130
Unlike the New 3809 Regulations, the USFS Regulations require anyone
desiring to operate a mine in a National Forest to submit a notice and
plan of operations if there will be any "significant" disturbance of the
surface. 1
31
The USFS Regulations are somewhat more streamlined than the
New 3809 Regulations. 32 The USFS Regulations also specify what rec-
lamation work is required and when it must be performed. 33 Reclama-
tion must be started upon exhaustion of the mineral deposit or other ear-
liest practicable time, or within one year of ceasing operations, unless
otherwise allowed by the USFS.1 34 This work includes controlling ero-
sion, landslides, and water runoff; isolating, removing, or controlling
toxic materials; reshaping and revegetating disturbed areas; and rehabili-
tating fisheries and wildlife habitats. 
35
With respect to financial guarantees, any operator required to file a
plan of operations136 is required to furnish a bond on request of the
USFS. 137 However, the USFS has learned lessons from other land man-
agement agencies regarding operator bankruptcy and abandonment of
mining operations and has found that in many cases bond amounts were
inadequate to cover reclamation costs. 138 As with the BLM, the USFS
has changed its practices to include long-term maintenance and monitor-
ing in reclamation cost estimates, and is also in the process of defining
financial arrangements, such as trusts, which could be used to fund long-
term obligations. 139 If such an instrument is deemed necessary, coordina-
tion with the Office of General Counsel and regional and national staff is
required. 140
Factors considered in the decision of whether to require a long-term
funding mechanism to secure the reclamation obligation are complex,
and the USFS has expressed a general preference for avoiding the need
lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, locating, and developing the mineral resources
thereof." Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 478 (2005)).
129. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 41 (discussing 36 C.F.R. § 228A (2005).
130. See United States v. Weiss 642 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1981).
131. NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 41-42. See also 36 C.F.R. § 228.4 (2005).
132. For example, there are express requirements for environmental protection in the USFS
Regulations that reference applicable standards in other federal environmental protection statutes,
such as the Clean Air Act. 36 C.F.R. § 228.8 (2005).
133. 36 C.F.R. § 228.8(g) (2005).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 36 C.F.R. § 228.4 (2005). Any operator whose activity will significantly disturb the
surface must file a plan of operations. Id.
137. 36 C.F.R. § 228.13(a) (2005).
138. TRAINING GUIDE, supra note 67, at 4-5.
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 24.
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for a long-term funding mechanism.'41 Such long-term costs are broken
down into two categories: (1) "actions with a finite life"' 142 and (2) ac-
tions with an open-ended or extended timeframe.143 Both of these types
of long-term costs should also account for replacement costs for capital
goods and equipment 14 as well as other assumed expenses.145
Bonds may be prohibitively expensive or impossible to acquire for
long-term, indefinite, or costly work as described above, and, by using a
present net value analysis to determine the initial deposit, a trust fund
could potentially be utilized to pay for these costs. 146 In this case, the
trustee would invest the trust corpus in "conservative instruments such as
federal securities.,'
147
II. INCOME TAx ISSUES RELATED TO THE USE OF TRUSTS TO FUND
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEAN-UP OBLIGATIONS
With respect to environmental clean-up trusts, the following two re-
lated tax questions arise: (a) when may a mining company deduct ex-
penses for reclamation work paid out of trust funds, 148 and (b) who is the
taxpayer with respect to income and deductions of an environmental
clean-up trust?
149
A. Deduction or Capitalization
Before analyzing the deductibility of environmental clean-up ex-
penses when a trust is used, it is necessary to understand the general de-
ductibility of these expenses when a mining company makes a payment
for environmental clean-up directly, without the use of a trust. The broad
issue is whether a payment is deductible or whether it must be capital-
ized.' 50 A deduction, if available, would be likely to fall under Sections
141. Id. at 23. To do so, the USFS has built features into the plan of operations that will miti-
gate or eliminate the need for long-term operation, maintenance, and monitoring costs. Id.
142. Id. Actions with a finite life include, for example, "fencing, road closures, or other means
until such time as long-term stability, erosion control, and revegetation have been successfully
established." Id.
143. Id. Open-ended actions include "road maintenance,.... diversion ditches, dams, water
treatment plants, fencing, gates, and signs," with the assumption that the "engineered" items will
require periodic maintenance, monitoring, and testing. Id.
144. Id. at 32.
145. Id. at 38-39.
146. Id. at 24.
147. Id.
148. In the author's opinion, the potential reasonable answers are: (1) when the mining com-
pany pays the money to the trustee, (2) when the trustee pays money out of the trust to do reclama-
tion work, (3) ratably, as mining work is done, and the obligation to do clean-up work accrues re-
gardless of the time of payment, or (4) never.
149. In the author's opinion, the potential reasonable answers are: (1) the mining company, (2)
the trust, or (3) the BLM.
150. Steven G. Black, The Continuing Saga of Environmental Cleanup Costs: Current Deduc-
tion Allowed Under the Restoration Principle of Plainfield-Union, 1995 BYU L. REV. 1321, 1321.
If it is deductible, the payment can potentially reduce that year's income; if it is capitalized, the
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162, 198, or 468151 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.152 Capitaliza-
tion is covered by Section 263.1
53
In general, if the deduction is available under Section 162, the year
in which the deduction may be taken will be determined primarily by
whether the company is a cash or accrual method taxpayer. 154 If, on the
other hand, the deduction is available under Section 198 or 468, the de-
duction may be taken in the year that the expense accrues regardless of
the taxpayer's accounting method.
55
In summary, there are two steps to analyzing the deductibility of
environmental clean-up expenses. First, one must determine if a pay-
ment is deductible or if it must be capitalized. Second, assuming that the
payment is deductible, one must determine the appropriate year of the
deduction.
1. Section 162-Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses
The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") first addressed the de-
ductibility of environmental remediation expenses in Revenue Ruling 94-
38156 (the "1994 Revenue Ruling"). In the 1994 Revenue Ruling, the
Service declared that costs incurred to treat soil and groundwater con-
taminated by hazardous waste from the taxpayer's business could be
deducted presently as ordinary and necessary business expenses under
Section 162 rather than capitalized under Section 263. 157 The Service
specifically found that these remedial actions did not permanently im-
prove the property or otherwise provide significant future benefits which
would require capitalization. 158 Remediation and groundwater treatment
merely restored the property to the condition in which the owner held it
prior to contamination, more akin to a repair than to a capital improve-
ment; accordingly, the Service determined that this allowed a present
deduction under the restoration principal of Plainfield- Union Water Co.
payment may be added to the mining company's income tax basis in the mine, reducing gain upon a
subsequent sale. I.R.C. §§ 263, 446(b) (2005).
151. 1.R.C. §§ 162, 198, 468 (2005). Section 162 is the general section for deducting ordinary
and necessary business expenses. Id. Sections 198 and 468 are special deductions specifically
related to environmental clean-up. Id. Section 162 does not specify the year in which the deduction
may be taken, while Sections 198 and 468 do. Id.
152. All references to the "Code" are references to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended. All references to a "Section," unless otherwise specified, are to a Section of the Code.
153. I.R.C. § 263 (2005).
154. § 162. See also Black, supra note 150, at 1323.
155. §§ 198, 468.
156. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35.
157. Id. Under the facts of the 1994 Revenue Ruling, the taxpayer had decided to remediate
soil and groundwater contaminated by its manufacturing activities. Id. The taxpayer constructed
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v. Commissioner.1 59 With respect to expenses to construct a groundwater
treatment facility, however, the Service ruled that the taxpayer had to
capitalize those expenses. 1
60
One year later, in Technical Advice Memorandum 95-41-005 61 (the
"1995 TAM"), the Service determined that the 1994 Revenue Ruling did
not allow for the deduction of collateral costs associated with environ-
mental remediation 1 62 The Service also determined that the restoration
principle it had applied in the 1994 Revenue Ruling and the court had
applied in Plainfield- Union Water Co. did not apply in situations in
which the taxpayer acquired the property in a contaminated condition.
1 63
In United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States,'64 the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio rejected the taxpayer's contention
that it was entitled to deduct under Section 162165 expenses incurred for
environmental remediation 1 66  The court emphasized the fact that the
two sites at issue had contaminated soil at the time of purchase by the
taxpayer. 167 Furthermore, the taxpayer's business activities did not pro-
duce the contamination.1 68 As a logical consequence, the taxpayer's
remediation efforts did not return the property to the condition it was in
when the taxpayer acquired it. 169 Therefore, the taxpayer had to capital-
ize those expenses.
1 70
After the 1995 TAM and United Dairy Farmers, the deductibility of
environmental remediation expenses appeared to turn entirely upon
whether the taxpayer's normal business activities produced the contami-
159. Id. See 39 T.C. 333, 333, 338 (1962), nonacq. on other grounds, 1964-2 C.B. 8 (holding
that certain expenses incurred in cleaning and lining water pipes were deductible repairs because
they did not materially add to the value of the property or prolong its useful life; instead, they re-
stored the pipeline to its condition before the damage). This is referred to hereinafter as the "restora-
tion principle."
160. Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35. The expenses had to be capitalized under Section
263(a) because their useful life extended beyond one year. Id.
161. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 95-41-005 (Sept. 27, 1995).
162. Id. "Collateral costs" include consulting contracts, costs of assessing contamination and
remediation alternatives, and legal fees for negotiating a consent decree with the Environmental
Protection Agency. Id.
163. Id. The Service noted that "the restoration principle envisions that the taxpayer acquired
the property in a clean condition, contaminated the property in the course of its everyday business
operations, and incurred costs to restore the property to its condition at the time the taxpayer ac-
quired the property." Id.
164. 107 F. Supp. 2d 937 (S.D. Ohio 2000).
165. Rather, the court concluded that the taxpayer was required to capitalize its expenses
incurred for environmental remediation. United Dairy Farmers, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 943.
166. Id. at 937.
167. Id. at 942.
168. Id. at 942-43.
169. Id. at 943. The taxpayer argued that it was unaware of the properties' contaminated
condition when it purchased them and that restoration merely returned the properties to the value the
taxpayer initially believed they possessed. Id. The court noted that deductibility did not turn on
one's subjective beliefs as to the value of property. Id.
170. Id.
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nation. The subsequent enactment of Section 198 changed this in certain
situations, at least temporarily.
171
2. Section 198-Qualified Environmental Remediation Expenditures
Section 198 allows "qualified environmental remediation expendi-
tures" paid or incurred by a taxpayer to be deducted in the year actually
paid or incurred even if the taxpayer acquired the property in a contami-
nated state. 172  "'Qualified environmental remediation expenditure'
means any expenditure ... which is paid or incurred in connection with
the abatement or control of hazardous substances at 'qualified contami-
nation site."",173 "Qualified contamination sites" generally include busi-
ness or investment property. 174 In order to presently deduct the expense,
this Section also mandates that the taxpayers acquire from the appropri-
ate state agency a statement that there has been a release, threat of re-
lease, or disposal of a hazardous substance on the property.
175 Signifi-
cantly, Section 198 does "not apply to expenditures paid or incurred after
December 31, 2005. ' '176
3. Section 162-Revisited
In 2004, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 2004-18177 (the "2004
Revenue Ruling"), which addresses the extent to which environmental
remediation costs can be deducted under Section 162 if they cannot be
deducted under Section 198.178 The factual situation in the 2004 Reve-
nue Ruling is similar to the one found in the 1994 Revenue Ruling.
179
Unlike the 1994 Revenue Ruling which had allowed a deduction of these
costs, in this newer ruling, the Service reached the opposite result, find-
ing that the soil and groundwater remediation costs had to be capital-
171. See discussion infra Part III.B regarding the timing of the deduction. It is important to
remember that the above discussion of Section 162 does not address the issue of timing if a deduc-
tion (rather than capitalization) is allowed. See id.
172. I.R.C. § 198(a) (2005).
173. I.R.C. § 198(b)(2) (2005). This occurs provided that these expenditures are not otherwise
required to be capitalized. I.R.C. § 198(b)(1) (2005).
174. I.R.C. § 198(c)(1) (2005). Specifically, "[t]he term 'qualified contamination site' means
an area... at or on which there has been a release (or threat of release) or disposal of any hazardous
substance" and "which (1) is held for use in a trade or business or for the production of income or (2)
is property [that qualifies as a capital asset] in the hands of the taxpayer." Id.; I.R.C. § 122 1(a)(1)
(2005).
175. I.R.C. § 198(c)(3) (2005). The chief executive officer of each state is allowed "to desig-
nate the appropriate state environmental agency within sixty days of the enactment of' I.R.C. § 198.
I.R.C. § 198(c)(4) (2005). The Environmental Protection Agency possesses the authority to desig-
nate such an agency in the event that such a chief executive officer fails to do so. Id.
176. I.R.C. § 198(h) (2005).
177. Rev. Rul. 2004-18, 2004-1 C.B. 509.
178. Id.
179. Compare Rev. Rul. 94-38, 1994-1 C.B. 35 with Rev. Rul. 2004-18, 2004-18 C.B. 509
9this is true even if the taxpayer has not yet unconditionally made the payment of the expenses).
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ized.180 After the 2004 Revenue Ruling and through December 31, 2005,
manufacturers generally cannot use Section 162 to deduct environmental
remediation expenses that are not otherwise deductible under Section
198.
4. Section 468-Qualified Reclamation Expenses
Section 468 permits mining companies to elect to deduct, currently,
certain future qualified reclamation expenses as those obligations are
incurred. 181 More specifically, Section 468 allows taxpayers to elect to
deduct an amount equal to the current estimated reclamation costs of
property disturbed during the taxable year in connection with coal min-
ing operations. 182 Current estimated reclamation costs equal the amount
that the taxpayer would be required to pay for qualified reclamation costs
if reclamation activities were performed currently.' 83
Qualified reclamation costs include expenses incurred in reclama-
tion activities conducted in accordance with a reclamation plan submitted
pursuant to the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977184
(the "SMCRA") or which is submitted pursuant to any other state or fed-
eral law imposing surface mining reclamation and permit requirements
"substantially similar" to those imposed by the SMCRA.185 Because the
SMCRA applies strictly to coal mine reclamation 186 and because the New
3809 Regulations do not apply to mining operations that involve coal,
187
the availability of Section 468 in connection with environmental recla-
mation trusts required under C.F.R. Section 3809.552(c) will turn on the
ability of the taxpayer to qualify on these "substantially similar" grounds.
180. Rev. Rul. 2004-18, 2004-18 C.B. 509. The Service noted that these costs were "incurred
by reason of' production activities within the meaning of Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-I(e)(3)(i) (as
amended in 2005). Id. Because the costs were properly allocatable to properly produced by the
taxpayer that was inventory in the hands of the taxpayer, the Service took the position that the tax-
payer needed to capitalize the remediation costs. Id. These costs must be treated as the costs of
acquiring inventory under Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-1(c)(3) (as amended in 2005). Id.
181. I.R.C. § 468 (2005).
182. § 468(a)(1)(A).
183. § 468(d)(1). This section requires taxpayers to establish reserves for each property the
taxpayer desires to have governed by Section 468. Id. The reserve is treated as having an opening
balance of zero during the initial tax year. § 468(a)(2)(A). The reserve is increased each year by the
amount of interest that would have been paid on the balance of the reserve at the beginning of a
taxable year, had the federal short-term rates applied with semi-annual compounding. §
468(a)(2)(B). The reserve is decreased by amounts actually paid by the taxpayer for qualified rec-
lamation costs and increased by the deduction allowed under the section. § 468(a)(2)(C), (D).
184. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91
Stat. 445 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
185. I.R.C. § 468(d)(2)(A) (2005). As a general matter, Section 468 has not produced much
case law or many administrative rulings, and the Service has not issued guidance as to what consti-
tutes "substantially similar."
186. 91 Stat. at 445.
187. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.2(e) (2005).
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B. Timing Issues
If it is determined that an expense may be deducted under Section
162, as opposed to capitalized under Section 263, it is necessary to de-
termine the year in which that deduction will be allowed.188 The timing
of the deduction under Section 162 is determined primarily by the tax-
payer's accounting method (cash or accrual). 1
89
1. Accounting Methods
In general, a cash basis taxpayer may deduct a payment when "ac-
tually" made but not when "constructively" made. 190 Absent a special
exception, this would mean that a cash basis mining company would be
able to deduct reclamation expenses only as that taxpayer actually pays
for reclamation work, not when the taxpayer puts money into a trust for
future reclamation work. The Treasury Regulations provide the follow-
ing special rule that is applicable in this situation: a "payment" occurs
when payment is made to a creditor, either by written agreement or pur-
suant to government, agency, or court order.'9' This, in effect, means
that a payment by a cash basis taxpayer to a trustee of a non-grantor trust
upon order by the BLM is treated as a deductible payment by that tax-
payer.1
92
While individual miners and small mining companies may be cash
method taxpayers, large publicly-traded mining companies generally are
accrual method taxpayers. 93 An accrual method taxpayer may deduct a
payment only when "all events" have occurred fixing the liability, except
for the passage of time, and if the amount can be determined with rea-
sonable accuracy. 194 In addition, no deduction is allowed until there has
188. Recall that the timing issues discussed herein relate only to Section 162 and not to Section
198 or 468. If the deduction is allowed under Section 198 or 468, the deduction is allowed in the
year the liability is incurred whether or not payment is made in that year. If the deduction is allowed
under Section 198 or 468, then it is an estimated amount determined as described above. See supra
Parts III.A.2, A.4.
189. I.R.C. § 162(a) (2005).
190. A payment is "constructively" made when it is made available but not actually paid to the
recipient. Vandel Poel, Francis & Co., Inc. v. Comm'r., 8 T.C. 407,411 (1947).
191. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) (as amended in 2004).
192. See id This general rule does not appear to apply to payments by cash method taxpayers
to "grantor trusts." A "grantor trust" is treated as not separate from the taxpayer for federal income
tax purposes; accordingly, no payment is made for federal income tax purposes when money is
transferred by a grantor to a trust that is a grantor trust with respect to that grantor. See infra notes
257-58 and accompanying text. A "non-grantor trust" is a trust that is treated as separate from the
grantor for federal income tax purposes. See infra Parts III.D-E.
193. I.R.C. § 448 (2005). Corporations whose average annual gross receipts in the prior three
years exceeded $5 million must use the accrual method of accounting. Id. It is worth noting that,
regardless of the accounting method used, mining companies often are eligible for special tax bene-
fits. For example, rather than depreciating an investment in a mine, the "cost depletion" method
often may be used to recover basis of investments in natural resources. I.R.C. §§ 611-12 (2005).
194. Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii) (as amended in 2003). This is known as the "all events"
test. Id.
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been "economic performance" by the taxpayer. 195 Economic perform-
ance generally does not occur when a taxpayer makes a contested pay-
ment to a third party, such as a trustee, for future payment to a credi-
tor. 1
96
2. Issues Unique to Utilizing Trusts for Remediation Costs
In general, the use of a trust to fund environmental clean-up obliga-
tions has no effect on whether an expense must be capitalized rather than
deducted. The use of a trust, however, can have a significant impact on
the year in which a deduction may be taken. This is primarily tied to
whether the trust is a "grantor trust" or a "non-grantor trust" for federal
income tax purposes. Accordingly, the discussion in this article regard-
ing grantor and non-grantor trust status1 97 is solely concerned with the
timing of deductions and assumes that the expenses are not the type that
must be capitalized.
When focusing on the timing of deductions, it is important to re-
member that any deduction that is allowed under Section 179 or 468 is
allowed in the year that the liability accrues regardless of the accounting
method used by the taxpayer. 98 Although this provides some conven-
ience and simplicity for the taxpayer's accountant, it also is important to
remember that Sections 179 and 468 only apply in limited situations'
99
and that Section 179 expires at the end of 2005 unless Congress extends
it.200
The timing of the deduction of "ordinary and necessary business
expenses" under Section 162 turns in large part on whether the trust is a
grantor trust and whether the taxpayer is an accrual or cash method tax-
payer. Accordingly, the remainder of this discussion will assume that the
taxpayer is seeking to deduct the environmental clean-up expenses under
Section 162.
195. I.R.C. § 46 1(h) (2005).
196. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(1)(i) (as amended in 1999). There are exceptions to this general
rule. Id. For example, economic performance occurs when money is paid to the trustee of a desig-
nated settlement fund or a qualified settlement fund. See infra Parts III.C.2-3 for detailed discus-
sion.
197. See infra Parts III.D-E.
198. I.R.C. §§ 179, 468 (2005). Under I.R.C. Sections 179 and 468, deductions are allowed
(i.e., they accrue) as liabilities are "incurred" even if no payment is made that year. Id. Although
there is no case law on this issue, it would appear that, with one exception, payment to a trust, in and
of itself, for "future" clean-up obligations, even upon order of the BLM, should not allow for a
present deduction under I.R.C. Sections 179 or 468 because the liability has not been incurred yet.
The one exception, of course, occurs when a cash method taxpayer makes a payment to a non-
grantor trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) (as amended in 2004). In that case, a deduction for the
full amount of the payment is allowed under Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1). Id. See supra note 180
and accompanying text.
199. See supra Parts II1.A.2, A.4.
200. I.R.C. § 198(h) (2005).
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C. Special Situations
Three special situations merit discussion at this point. More spe-
cifically, the following three relevant types of trusts or funds20 1 are spe-
cifically identified in either the Code or the Treasury Regulations:
(1) environmental remediation trusts, 20 2 (2) designated settlement
funds,20 3 and (3) qualified settlement funds.2° The Code or Treasury
Regulations specify how and when each of these trusts is taxed.20 5 Be-
cause the rules could potentially apply to trusts created under the New
3809 Regulations, each of the three types of trusts is specifically dis-
cussed below. In general, with a few exceptions that are discussed be-
low, trusts created under the New 3809 Regulations are not likely to be
environmental remediation trusts, designated settlement funds, or quali-
fied settlement funds.
1. Environmental Remediation Trusts
Treasury Regulations Section 301.7701-4(e) 20 6 (the "Environmental
Remediation Trust Regulations") specifically states that "environmental
remediation trusts" are considered trusts for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code.20 7 This Regulation also states that each grantor of the
trust shall be treated as the owner for federal income tax purposes of the
portion of the trust contributed by the grantor under Section 677.208 As
discussed in greater detail below,20 9 Section 677 treats the grantor of the
trust as the owner when he or she has the discretion to distribute trust
income to himself or herself.210 Treasury Regulations Section 301.7701-
7(e)(1) defines an environmental remediation trust as:
[A]n organization that is organized under state law as a trust; the
primary purpose of the trust is collecting and distributing amounts for
environmental remediation of an existing waste site to resolve, sat-
isfy, mitigate, address, or prevent the liability or potential liability of
persons imposed by federal, state, or local environmental laws; all
contributors to the trust have actual or potential liability or a reason-
able expectation of liability under federal, state, or local environ-
mental laws for environmental remediation of the waste site; and the
201. Both "funds" and "trusts" are referred to merely as "trusts" herein for convenience.
202. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(e) (as amended in 1996).
203. I.R.C. § 468B (2005).
204. Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1 (as amended in 1993).
205. Id.; § 468B.
206. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(e) (as amended in 1996).
207. Id.
208. § 301.7701-4(e)(2).
209. See infra Part III.D.
210. I.R.C. § 677 (2005).
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trust is not a qualified settlement fund within the meaning of
§ 1.468B-l(a).2 1'
The term "existing waste site," as used in the above text, is not de-
fined in the Treasury Regulations or elsewhere. Members of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Environmental Tax Committee had suggested that
the regulations define an "existing waste site" to mean a "site at which an
event (or related series of events) has occurred which has given or may
give rise to at least one claim asserting liability under federal, state, or
local environmental laws., 2 12  The Department of the Treasury (the
"Treasury") responded to this request by noting that the final regulations
would not adopt this definition because it is sufficiently clear that the
rule applies to sites currently needing environmental remediation.2 13
As mentioned above, the BLM intends to use the New 3809 Regula-
tions to require mining companies to establish a trust fund for environ-
mental clean-up in order to secure a permit to start digging.21 4 Because
such a permit is likely to be sought at a site at which there has been no
contamination or that does not "currently" requires remediation, the En-
vironmental Remediation Trust Regulations generally do not appear to
apply to trusts created under the New 3809 Regulations.215
2. Designated Settlement Funds
Code Section 468B 216 provides that "economic performance' 217 is
deemed to occur when qualified payments are made by a taxpayer to a
"designated settlement fund., 218 This rule means that, assuming there is
a qualified payment, an accrual method taxpayer can deduct in the year
of payment the full amount paid to a trustee of a trust that qualifies as a
designated settlement fund.
Section 468B specifically defines a "qualified payment," with some
exceptions, as "any money or property which is transferred to any desig-
211. § 301.7701-4(e)(1) (emphasis added).
212. See Jerold N. Cohen, ABA Members Suggest Clarification of Definitions in Regs on Envi-
ronmental Settlement Funds, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 290-44 (1995).
213. 26 C.F.R. Parts 1, 301, and 602, RIN 1545-AT02, at 13. Specifically, the Treasury stated
that "[t]he term existing waste site should be sufficiently specific to allow taxpayers to establish an
environmental remediation trust for any contaminated site that currently requires remediation under
environmental laws." Id. (emphasis added).
214. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. Although the BLM may require a trust fund at
any time, from the author's experience, the trust will need to be funded before the BLM will issue a
permit to commence mining work.
215. This would not be the case, however, if the BLM were to require the creation of a trust
after mining work has commenced, assuming there is then contamination at the site.
216. I.R.C. § 468B (2005).
217. Id. The effect of this section is to modify the "economic performance" requirement of
I.R.C. § 461(h), applicable only to accrual method taxpayers, with respect to a specific situation.
I.R.C. § 461(h) (2005). Accordingly, this section only applies to accrual method taxpayers. § 468B.
218. § 468B(a).
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nated settlement fund pursuant to court order .... ,,219 Furthermore, that
section requires, among other things, that a designated settlement fund be
used for tort claims arising out of personal or property damage.22°
A designated settlement fund is taxed on all income earned by the
fund, and it is allowed to deduct certain administration expenses. 221 It is
allowed no other deductions, such as a deduction for distributions related
to tort claims.222 Thus, the basic idea is that a taxpayer is allowed a pre-
sent deduction for all money paid into the trust for tort liabilities, the
fund is taxed as a separate taxpayer on its income, and the trust cannot
deduct payments to satisfy tort liabilities.223
A trust fund established under the New 3809 Regulations is not es-
tablished pursuant to court order.2 24 Furthermore, the trust fund gener-
ally does not extinguish a mining company's tort liability with respect to
any future tort claims. 225 Therefore, a trust fund created under the New
3809 Regulations is not a designated settlement fund.
3. Qualified Settlement Funds
Treasury Regulations Section 1.468B-1 226 provides for the creation
of "qualified settlement funds," which are treated the same as designated
settlement funds for federal income tax purposes.2 7 The definition of
"qualified settlement funds" is much broader than the definition of "des-
ignated settlement funds" and specifically includes funds established or
approved by order of the United States, any state, or any agency or in-
strumentality of the United States or any state.228 These funds must be
"established to resolve or satisfy one or more contested or uncontested
claims that have resulted or may result from an event (or related series of
events) that has occurred and that has given rise to at least one claim
asserting liability ....,,229 under the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980230 ("CERCLA"), arising
219. § 468B(d)(1).
220. § 468B(d)(I)(A). Specifically, a "designated settlement fund" must be "established pur-
suant to a court order and [it must be a fund] which extinguishes completely the taxpayer's tort
liability with respect to [certain future tort claims arising out of personal injury, death, or property
damage]." § 468B(d)(2)(A).
221. § 468B(b). The fund is taxable in its investment income at the rates found in I.R.C. § 1(e)
(2005).
222. I.R.C. § 468B(b)(2) (2005).
223. Id. In short, this is a provision that allows accrual method taxpayers to take a full deduc-
tion much earlier than otherwise would be allowed (because of the economic performance require-
ment), but the provision also ensures that the fund will pay taxes on its income. Id.
224. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552 (2005).
225. Id.
226. Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1 (as amended in 1993).
227. Id.
228. § 1.468B-1(c)(1) (emphasis added).
229. § 1.468B-1 (c)(2) (emphasis added).
230. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42
U.S.C. § 9601-75 (2005).
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out of a tort, breach of contract, or violation of law, or designated by the
Service in a revenue ruling or revenue procedure.231
Although a government agency (the BLM) is ordering the creation
of the trust under the New 3809 Regulations, the environmental claims
do not arise from CERCLA and, more importantly, generally do not arise
from any event "that has occurred., 232 Instead, the fund generally is re-
quired in anticipation of an event that may occur (i.e., environmental
contamination once mining operations commence).233 Thus, a trust fund
created under the New 3809 Regulations prior to the issuance of a permit
to start digging generally will not be a qualified settlement fund.234
D. Grantor Trusts
Depending on the terms of a trust, for federal income tax purposes,
its income and deductions may be treated as income and deductions of
(a) the trust as a separate taxable entity, (b) the grantor of the trust, or
(c) a third party.235 Section 671 generally provides that when treated as
the owner of the trust, income, deductions, and credits attributable to the
trust shall be considered in calculating the taxable income of the grantor
or the third party as if that grantor or third party, respectively, directly
engaged in the trust's activities and transactions.236
Sections 673 through 677 determine when a grantor will be treated
as the owner of a trust with a United States situs, Section 679 determines
when a grantor will be treated as the owner of a foreign trust, and Section
678 determines when a third party will be treated as the owner of a trust
in the United States.237 Under Section 673, a grantor shall be treated as
the owner of any portion of the trust when he or she retains a reversion-
ary interest in the corpus or income from that portion if, as of the incep-
tion of that portion of the trust, the value of such interest exceeds five
percent of the value of such portion.238
Under Section 674, the grantor shall be treated as the owner of the
trust where the beneficial enjoyment of the corpus or the income is sub-
ject to a power of disposition, exercisable by the grantor or a nonadverse
231. § 1.468B- (c)(2).
232. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
233. 43 C.F.R. § 3809.552 (2005).
234. Because the New 3809 Regulations also allow the BLM to require the creation of a trust
after work has begun, it is possible that the trust would be a qualified settlement fund under those
circumstances. See supra text accompanying note 13.
235. I.R.C. § 671 (2005). The term "grantor trust" is generally used even if the taxpayer with
respect to the trust is a third party rather than the grantor. Accordingly, for the sake of clarity, this
article will frequently distinguish a "grantor trust with respect to the grantor" from a "grantor trust
with respect to a third party."
236. Id.
237. I.R.C. §§ 673-79 (2005). The term "situs" as used in this context refers to the primary
place of administration of the trust.
238. § 673(a).
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party 239 without the approval or consent of an adverse party.240 Sec-
tion 675 provides that grantors with certain administrative powers shall
be treated as the owners of trusts for federal income tax purposes. 241 The
powers that cause the trust to be a grantor trust include the power to pur-
chase, exchange, or otherwise deal with the corpus or income of the trust
for less than adequate and full consideration, the power to borrow the
corpus or income of the trust without adequate interest or security, and
certain "general powers of administration., 242 This section also provides
that when a grantor has directly or indirectly borrowed the corpus or in-
come, and has not completely repaid the loan before the beginning of the
taxable year, he or she will be treated as the owner of the trust.
243
Under Section 676, a grantor shall be treated as the owner of a trust
when the power to revest title in the grantor is exercisable by the grantor
or a nonadverse party.2 " Section 677 states a grantor shall be treated as
the owner of any trust whose income in the discretion of the grantor, may
be distributed to the grantor or grantor's spouse, held or accumulated for
future distribution to the grantor or his or her spouse, or applied to the
payment of certain life insurance policies.245
Under Section 678, a person or entity other than a grantor246 shall be
treated as the owner of any portion of a trust with respect to which he or
she either (1) has a power exercisable alone to vest the income or corpus
in him or herself or (2) has previously partially released or modified such
a power and after the release or modification retains such control as
would cause a grantor to be treated as the owner.247 Lastly, Section 679
notes a resident of the United States who directly or indirectly transfers
property to a foreign trust is treated as the owner for the taxable year of
239. I.R.C. § 672(b) (2005). I.R.C. § 672(b) defines a nonadverse party simply as any person
who is not an adverse party. Id.
240. I.R.C. § 672(a) (2005). I.R.C. § 672(a) defines adverse party as "any person having a
substantial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected by the exercise or non-
exercise of the power he possesses respecting the trust." Id. A general power of appointment over
trust property is deemed to be a beneficial interest in the trust. Id. I.R.C. § 674(b) lists eight trust
powers to which I.R.C. § 674 does not apply. § 674(b).
241. I.R.C. § 675 (2005).
242. Id. 1.R.C. § 675(4) lists the following three specific powers that qualify as general powers
of administration: (1) the power to vote stock of a corporation in which the holdings of the grantor
and the trust are significant from the viewpoint of voting control, (2) the power to control the in-
vestment of the trust funds, either by directing investments or reinvestments or by vetoing proposed
investments or reinvestments, and (3) the power to reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other
property of an equivalent value. § 675(4).
243. § 675(3).
244. I.R.C. § 676(a) (2005).
245. I.R.C. § 676(b) (2005), however, provides that Section 676(a) does not apply to a power
the exercise of which can only affect the beneficial enjoyment after the occurrence of an event.
I.R.C. § 676(b) (2005).
246. A person or entity other than a grantor is considered a third party.
247. I.R.C. § 678 (2005). This situation is referred to throughout this article as a "grantor trust
with respect to a third party."
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the portion attributable to that property if there is a United States benefi-
ciary of any portion of the trust.
248
A trust established to cover future environmental remediation ex-
penses may qualify (and, in fact, is likely to qualify) as a grantor trust
with respect to the grantor (i.e., the mining company) based on general
tax principles and the Treasury Regulations issued under Section 677.249
Treasury Regulations Section 1.677(a)-l(d) 250 provides "a grantor is, in
general, treated as an owner of a portion of a trust whose income is, or in
the discretion of the grantor or a nonadverse party, or both, may be ap-
plied in discharge of any legal obligation of the grantor .... 9Q1 ' This
regulation reflects general economic neutrality principles articulated in
Old Colony Trust v. Commissioner,252 namely that the discharge of a
legally enforceable obligation by a third party produces income to the
obligor. 3 Thus, a trust established to fund future environmental reme-
diation costs should be treated as a grantor trust if the income of the trust
is used to discharge the grantor of liability at the time of payment under
federal, state, or local environmental laws. Ultimately, however, the
terms of the trust agreement and the arrangement with the BLM regard-
ing the trust will determine if the trust is a grantor trust.254 This is dis
cussed in greater detail below. 55
1. Deductions
When discussing deductions with respect to trusts, it is essential to
remember that there are two relevant types of deductions. First, there is
the possibility of deducting payments made by the grantor256 to the trust
for environmental clean-up. Second, there is the possibility of deducting
amounts paid out of the trust, for administration expenses as well as en-
vironmental clean-up costs, over time.
With respect to a trust that is a grantor trust with respect to the gran-
tor, a payment by the grantor to that trust is treated as having not been
248. I.R.C. § 679(a)(1) (2005).
249. Treas. Reg. § 1.677(a) (as amended in 1971).
250. § 1.677(a)-I(d).
251. Id.
252. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
253. Old Colony Trust Co., 279 U.S. at 729. In Old Colony Trust Co., the court found that
income taxes paid by an employer, on behalf of an employee, resulted in compensation to the em-
ployee. Id. The court found the arrangement economically equivalent to the employer paying the
employee additional cash compensation, and the employee using this additional compensation to pay
his own tax bill. Id. In the context of a trust established to cover future environmental remediation
costs, discharging a grantor's obligation with income from the trust is equivalent to paying that
income directly to the grantor, which would cause the trust to be treated as a grantor trust under
I.R.C. § 677 and the rule of Old Colony Trust.
254. I.R.C. § 676(a) (2005).
255. See infra Part lI.D.2.
256. In this situation, the grantor is the mining company.
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made for federal income tax purposes.2 57 Thus, a taxpayer cannot take a
deduction solely by virtue of making such a payment regardless of
258whether the taxpayer is a cash or accrual method taxpayer. 8 When
amounts are ultimately distributed out of the trust for environmental
clean-up, those amounts may be deducted by the grantor if the grantor
could deduct the payments if they had been made directly by the grantor
for that clean-up.259
With respect to a trust that is a grantor trust with respect to a third
party,260 the analysis is somewhat different. When a cash method grantor
makes a payment to that trust, it is as if the grantor paid the money di-
rectly to the third party.261 Assuming that this payment is being made
pursuant to an order of a government agency, such as the BLM, and as-
suming that the third party is a "creditor" of the grantor, then the pay-
ment should be deductible when made to the trust if a payment directly
to that third party, by the taxpayer, would be deductible.262 Subsequent
income earned by the trust after the contribution to the trust is taxable to
the third party.263 This may provide a planning opportunity if it is possi-
ble to make a tax-exempt entity such as the BLM the third party to whom
the trust income is taxable. This potentially can be accomplished with
careful planning.264
2. Qualifying the Trust as a Grantor Trust with Respect to the
Grantor
In general, it should not be very difficult to qualify the trust as a
grantor trust with respect to the grantor.265 First, if the grantor retains a
reversionary interest equal to at least five percent of the initial trust
value, then the trust will be a grantor trust under Section 676.266 Because
certain mining companies will want a reversionary interest if it turns out
that the funds are not needed for environmental clean-up, there is a dis-
tinct possibility that the trust will be a grantor trust.26 7  Other mining
companies may view the requirement that they fund a trust for environ-
mental clean-up as a cost of doing business; in this case they may be
257. Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184.
258. For federal tax purposes, it is as if no transfer has been made. This does not prevent the
taxpayer from utilizing deductions that accrue regardless of payment. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 179, 468
(2005).
259. That is when a payment is occurring for federal income tax purposes.
260. I.R.C. § 678 addresses such trusts. I.R.C. § 678 (2005).
261. For federal income tax purposes, the trust does not exist, and the third party is the tax-
payer.
262. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1) (as amended in 2004).
263. I.R.C. §§ 671, 678 (2005).
264. See discussion infra Part II.D.3.
265. 1.R.C. § 676 (2005). In fact, the author believes that environmental clean-up trusts will
more commonly be treated as grantor trusts with respect to the grantor for federal income tax pur-
poses.
266. Id.
267. This has been the author's personal experience.
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willing to forego any reversionary interest.268 The company could forego
a reversionary interest, for example, by directing that any funds left in
the trust upon its termination will be paid to charity.269 The company
may want to do this, among other reasons, if doing so will sever its ties
to the trust for federal income tax purposes.27°
A second basis for ensuring that the trust will be a grantor trust with
respect to the grantor, if this is desired, is to affirmatively establish that
all income from the trust will be used to satisfy an on-going obligation of
the grantor to clean-up the environment. This would appear to be the
case if the grantor has an on-going clean-up obligation and if the trust
funds are used to satisfy that obligation; it would not be the case if the
grantor has completely satisfied its obligations to the BLM upon funding
the trust.
271
3. Qualifying the Trust as a Grantor Trust with Respect to the BLM
Attempting to make the BLM the taxpayer with respect to the trust
is a novel idea, which, if it works, would have extremely favorable tax
consequences.272 The general idea is that the BLM could be given an
unrestricted power each year to withdraw all trust income each year for a
limited period of time.273 Assuming that the grantor of the trust, i.e., the
mining company, would not otherwise be treated as the owner of the
income of the trust, then the BLM would be treated as the owner of the
trust for federal income tax purposes.27  Because the BLM is exempt
268. This has been the author's personal experience.
269. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2055-1 (as amended in 1974).
270. Specifically, a company should consider doing so if it will make the trust a non-grantor
trust.
271. See supra note 113. The BLM generally takes the position that a financial guarantee does
not release the mining company of its clean-up obligations. See supra text accompanying note 113.
That being said, it may be possible to negotiate an arrangement with the BLM under which the
mining company would put an extra-large amount into trust in complete satisfaction of its clean-up
obligations with respect to the permit that it is seeking to obtain.
272. The possibility of doing this was originally suggested by Bill Huff of HRO.
273. The withdrawal power should last at least 30 days each year. This type of withdrawal
power, used in other contexts, is commonly referred to as a "Crummey power" as a result of the case
of Crummey v. Comm'r., 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 772 (1966). See 5 BORIs 1. BITrKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS 124.3.3 (2d ed. 1993) (using the
term "Crummey power" to describe the unrestricted ability to withdraw trust income for a limited
period of time). The holder of a Crummey power is the owner of the portion of the trust to which the
power applies under I.R.C. § 678, provided that the grantor of the trust is not the owner of that
portion by virtue of I.R.C. §§ 676, 677, or 679(a) (2005). See I.R.C. §§ 676-78, 679(a) (2005);
BIrTKER & LOKKEN, supra, 124.3.3; infra note 274.
274. I.R.C. § 678(b) (2005). It appears that if the BLM withdraws income earned by the Trust,
it may be required to deposit that income in the United States Treasury "as soon as practicable with-
out deduction for any charge or claim." If this is true, it would potentially mean that the BLM is not
the beneficiary of the trust for federal income tax purposes, and therefore the trust would not be a
grantor trust with respect to the BLM under I.R.C. § 678. The counter argument, brought to the
author's attention by Kelly Berg and Chuck Ramunno at HRO, is that the United States government
as a whole is the beneficiary, and the BLM is a part of the United States government. This means
that the United States government is in effect the beneficiary and the holder of the withdrawal
power. Note that if the neither the grantor of the trust nor any third party is treated as the owner for
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from tax by virtue of the fact that the Code does not impose tax on gov-
ernment agencies, no taxes would be owed on account of income earned
by the trust.275
The primary problems with this idea are: (1) it may be difficult to
ensure that the trust is not a grantor trust with respect to the grantor,276
and (2) the BLM may not be amenable to the idea due to concerns about
its fiduciary responsibility or changes to the tax law with respect to its
tax-exempt status.277 It may be worth considering the use of this type of
withdrawal power, however, in such a manner that they will become
effective if and when the grantor goes out of business.278 Assuming that
the BLM would like to keep the trust in existence after the grantor no
longer exists, then it would appear to be preferable to have the trust be
tax-exempt at that time, if possible. 79
E. Non-Grantor Trusts
A trust that is not a grantor trust will be a non-grantor trust. Al-
though it may be difficult to structure an environmental clean-up trust as
a non-grantor trust, it should not be impossible under the right circum-
stances. As mentioned above, two key elements are to ensure that the
grantor does not retain a reversionary interest greater than five percent of
the trust's initial value and to ensure that the trust income is not used to
satisfy an ongoing obligation of the grantor. 280
1. Deductibility of Payments to the Trust
If the trust is a non-grantor trust, payments to the trust upon order
by the BLM will be deductible by cash method taxpayers as a result of
Treasury Regulations Section 1.461-2(c)(1). 281  With respect to accrual
method taxpayers, because the rules regarding designated settlement
funds and qualified settlement funds generally will not apply to environ-
federal income tax purposes, then the trust is taxed as a separate entity (i.e., a non-grantor trust).
I.R.C. § 678 (2005).
275. It is interesting to note that, although I.R.C. § 170(c), allows for the deduction of contribu-
tions to government agencies, I.R.C. § 501, does not directly provide that government agencies are
tax-exempt. I.R.C. §§ 170(c), 501 (2005). That would appear to be due to the fact that the Code
does not tax those agencies in the first place.
276. This is because the grantor may be satisfying an on-going obligation with trust income.
See supra notes 252-55 and accompanying text. Recall that if both the grantor and a third party
could be treated as the owner of the trust for federal income tax purposes, then the grantor is treated
as the owner. § 678(b).
277. These problems arose during the author's negotiations with the BLM.
278. One could call this a "springing Crummey power," or one that appears when the grantor
disappears.
279. Remember that one of the primary reasons for creating these trusts in the first place is to
ensure that funds are available for environmental clean-up in the event that the mining company
declares bankruptcy or ceases to exist.
280. See supra Part II.D.2.
281. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c)(1)(1996).
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mental clean-up trusts,282 the economic performance rule283 will prevent
the grantor from taking a deduction until the funds are actually distrib-
uted from the trust for environmental clean-up work.284
2. Taxation of Income Earned by the Trust
A non-grantor trust that may retain or distribute income is referred
to as a complex trust.285 Complex trusts are taxed on all trust income;
however, the trust is a allowed deduction for administrative expenses as
well as for income that has been distributed to a beneficiary.286
III. PROPOSAL FOR TAx LAW CHANGE
As is evident from the multitude of Code Sections and Treasury
Regulations that are potentially applicable to environmental clean-up
287trusts, Congress and the Treasury did not anticipate the creation of
trusts under the New 3809 Regulations. Accordingly, in the interest of
certainty for taxpayers and the BLM, Congress or the Treasury should
take action to make the law clear with respect to these trusts.
A. The Options
There are two logical options with respect to these trusts. First, the
Code could be amended to deem the trust to be a grantor trust with re-
spect to the grantor, fully taxable to the grantor as if the trust did not ex-
ist.288 In this case, no deduction would be allowed solely as a result of a
contribution to the trust.28 9 The grantor could take deductions as distri-
butions are made from the trust in the future or, if deductions can be ac-
crued earlier under Section 179 or 468, then they could be taken ear-
lier.290
There is a sub-issue in this case regarding what happens if and when
the grantor ceases to exist and if the trust is a grantor trust with respect to
the grantor. In that case, the Code could make it clear that the trust either
282. See discussion supra Part II.C.2-3.
283. I.R.C. § 461(h) (2005); discussion supra Part II.B.1.
284. It is only at this point that "economic performance" will occur. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-
4(g)(1)(i) (2005).
285. See Clark Trust v. Comm'r., 49 T.C. 456, 458-59 (1968).
286. Id. See also I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (2005).
287. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 162, 198, 468, 468B (2005); Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-4(e) (as amended
in 1996); Treas. Reg. § 1.468B-1 (as amended in 1993).
288. Absent careful planning, this is most likely how such a trust would be treated under I.R.C.
§ 671; however, the current state of the law imposes uncertainty on the Service and on mining com-
panies. See supra Part II.D. In the author's experience, this uncertainty has caused the BLM to
insist that the mining company obtain at least one Private Letter Ruling to determine the income tax
consequences under the New 3809 Regulations.
289. A downside of this approach is the possibility that grantor trust status could increase the
likelihood that a creditor could reach trust assets if the grantor declares bankruptcy. Bankruptcy
issues are beyond the scope of this article.
290. See discussion supra Parts II.A.2, A.4.
20051
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
becomes a fully-taxable independent entity or a tax-exempt entity. In the
author's experience, tax-exempt status at that point would be the prefer-
able option both from the standpoint of the BLM and from the standpoint
of mining companies because it would greatly simplify the initial compu-
tation of the amounts needed to ensure that environmental clean-up work
can be completed.291 It also would make more money available for that
purpose by not reducing the growth in the trust value by income taxes.
Second, Congress or the Treasury could deem these trusts to be
separate taxpayers like designated settlement funds or qualified settle-
ment funds. In this case, the mining company would be allowed a cur-
rent deduction, and the fund would be taxable on its income as a separate
entity. Alternatively, the fund could be deemed to be a separate entity
that is tax-exempt. While this would have an impact on government
revenue, it would maximize the growth of these funds for environmental
clean-up work. 92
B. Proposal
In the author's experience, mining companies and the BLM are
seeking simplicity and certainty with respect to the taxation of trusts un-
der the New 3809 Regulations. In addition, the BLM has a great interest
in ensuring that trust funds are not reachable by the mining companies'
creditors. 93 With this in mind, it seems that the most favorable approach
would be to grant mining companies a present deduction for amounts
contributed to environmental clean-up trusts whenever a trust is required
by the BLM under the New 3809 Regulations. In addition, these trusts
should be non-grantor trusts for income tax purposes. Allowing the de-
duction coupled with non-grantor trust status would help to disentangle
mining companies from these trusts, which in turn should make the trust
assets somewhat safer from the perspective of keeping them out of the
reach of creditors. Because the decision regarding whether a trust will be
required is entirely within the control of the BLM, there is also little
chance that these trusts would be used for tax evasion.
294
With respect to the non-grantor trust status of the trust once it is
funded, it seems that an additional tax benefit could be used to give min-
291. It is virtually impossible to accurately estimate how much is needed in a fund if: (1) the
mining company pays all taxes on the fund while the company is in existence, and (2) the trust has to
pay taxes out of the trust if and when the mining company ceases to exist.
292. It is axiomatic that a fund that grows tax-free will grow more quickly than a fund whose
growth is reduced by the payment of taxes each year. See Spartech Corp. v. Opper, 890 F.2d 949,
955 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing taxes as expenses).
293. During the author's negotiations with the BLM in conjunction with the preparation of
environmental clean-up trusts for his firm's clients, the concern that was most frequently conveyed
by the BLM was that the funds would not be available to the mining company's creditors in the
event that the mining company were to declare bankruptcy.
294. To further minimize the possibility of tax evasion, amounts that revert to the grantor upon
termination of the trust, if any, should be included in the grantor's income.
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ing companies an incentive to sever all potential reversionary interests in
the trust: the trust should be tax-exempt if the mining company retains no
reversionary interest in the trust whatsoever. For example, if the trust
terms provide that unused trust funds ultimately pass to charity,29 5 then
the trust should be tax-exempt. This would mean that less money would
be needed up-front to adequately fund the trust, giving mining companies
an incentive to agree to this approach. 296 If the company refuses, 297 the
trust would be a taxable entity. This would mean that the mining com-




The BLM enacted the New 3809 Regulations to ensure that trust
funds would be available for environmental clean-up. 299  Because taxa-
tion has a great impact on how quickly a long-term trust fund will grow,
this objective is not likely to be met as long as the Code does not provide
certainty to mining companies and to the BLM regarding how these
trusts will be taxed.3 ° °
Regardless of the ultimate approach used, Congress and the Treas-
ury should create a clear rule. Because the funds are being set aside for
long-term or indefinite periods of time, because the amounts put into
these trusts have been computed by a government agency, 30 and because
it is likely that the funds ultimately will be used in a way that will benefit
the general public, the mining company should be given a present deduc-
tion for the total amount put into the trust and, once the trust is funded,
the trust should be a tax-exempt entity if the mining company retains no
reversionary interest in the trust.30 2 Doing this will maximize the amount
295. For example, the trust funds could pass to the Nevada Division of Wildlife.
296. Less money would be needed up-front because the fund would grow faster if it is not
reduced by taxes each year. See supra note 292.
297. Refusing, in this situation, would occur if the mining company insists on keeping a rever-
sionary interest in the trust.
298. See supra note 292. It follows that more money would be needed up-front because the
trust would have a lower anticipated growth rate as a result of its status as a taxable entity.
299. See supra Part I.D.
300. For example, assume that the BLM and "Clementine's Mining Company" agree that a
trust will be set up as a grantor trust. In that case, they would project the growth of the trust under
the assumption that the fund's growth rate will not be reduced by taxes each year. If Clementine's
subsequently goes out of business and if the Service determines that the trust is not tax-exempt, then
the trust fund will suddenly begin to be reduced by taxes. In that case, the assets left in the trust
would probably be insufficient to fully fund the required environmental clean-up. Because it is
impossible to predict if and when Clementine's will go out of business, current law would require a
lot of speculation regarding whether the trust will ever be taxable. Clementine's would argue that it
will never go out of business. The BLM would argue that it is going to go out of business at any
moment. As the author can attest, this makes for some awkward negotiations.
301. In this situation, the computing agency would be the BLM.
302. As mentioned above, the tax exemption could be used to give mining companies an incen-
tive to forego any reversionary interest. If the mining company chooses to keep a reversionary
interest, the fund could be taxable, much like designated settlement funds and qualified settlement
funds. See supra Parts 1.C.2-3.
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available for environmental clean-up. It also will provide mining com-
panies and the BLM with certainty and clarity, and perhaps it will foster
greater support for the New 3809 Regulations in the mining industry.
